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ABSTRACT
This paper studies U.S. overseas assembly imports to identify whether factors related to information
or search costs appear to condition outsourcing decisions. The data for 1991-2000 show that U.S.
overseas assembly imports were characterized by incomplete pass-through of production and trade
costs to import prices, though products assembled in more highly educated countries passed-through
a much larger portion of their cost changes. In addition, the price of outsourcing imports responded
to competing suppliers' prices, with the largest responses occurring for products in capital-intense
industries. These differential price responses suggest that information issues play an important role
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Introduction 
 
  A growing body of work in international trade focuses on the institutions and 
economic conditions that facilitate the formation of international trading relationships.  
For example, information is now recognized as a pivotal element in the globalization 
process.  Nonetheless, the benefits of informational improvements, such as reduced costs 
of telephone calls or increasingly sophisticated bar code transmission and management 
tools, are not likely to affect all producers uniformly.  Rauch and Trindade (2003) show 
that product differentiation in consumption or production produces a degree of “natural 
protection”.  As a result, improvements in information technology are likely to render the 
greatest increases in the global integration for those markets where the matching of 
differentiated partners is critical to the formation of successful international partnerships. 
  Overseas outsourcing is a component of the globalization process that has 
attracted particular concern as the public has become familiar with the idea that 
improvements in information technologies enable companies to reduce costs by 
outsourcing inputs and assembly from lower cost overseas locations.
1  Indeed, the growth 
in overseas outsourcing has contributed significantly to the growth of trade volumes.
2   
    It is certainly true that internationally fragmented production processes allow 
producers to take advantage of factor price differences, and may even facilitate factor 
                                                           
1   Popular attention is especially focused on the domestic employment impacts of overseas outsourcing.  
However, Amiti and Wei (2004) provide evidence showing that the presumption of outsourcing job loss 
may be reversed if one also accounts for the simultaneous job gains associated with international 
“insourcing”.  
2 Hummels, Ishii and Yi (2001) present evidence from 10 OECD and four emerging markets which 
indicates that  increases in vertical specialization accounts for  30% of export growth between 1970 and 
1990.  By 1990 vertical specialization accounted for 21% of these countries' exports.  A broad review of the 
trends is contained in Feenstra (1998). In related work Hanson, Mataloni and Slaughter (2003) document 
that U.S. multinationals increased their vertical activities in the 1990’s, while Gorg (2000) and Swenson 
(2004) study the empirical determinants of outsourcing location choices.    2
price equalization.
3  However, Grossman and Helpman (2004) show that country cost 
differences are not sufficient in of themselves to generate overseas fragmentation.  Search 
and customization costs, in conjunction with incomplete contracting issues, also influence 
the outsourcing location choice.  This is because the magnitude of search and adaptation 
costs ultimately influences the market thickness of potential partners, which helps 
determine whether Northern firms search for partners at home or in the lower-cost South. 
A key goal of this paper is to examine whether outsourcing relationships exhibit 
characteristics that are consistent with international trade theories based on information 
search and matching issues.  To set the stage, this paper documents pricing regularities 
that characterize the pricing decisions for U.S. outsourcing imports that arrived via the 
9802 overseas assembly program, which assists firms that use U.S.-origin parts, materials 
or components in their overseas assembly operations.   
The empirical estimates of pricing decisions are based on a simple Bertrand 
model with differentiated goods which is modified to account for the cost structure and 
tariff treatment facing outsourcing producers who participated in the 9802 program.  This 
framework allows one to pay particular attention to the pass-through of production costs 
and the degree to which producers emulate their competitors’ price changes.  A major 
benefit of studying the 9802 program is that heterogeneity in producer input choices 
provides rich variation in the production and trade cost measures which can be exploited 
to identify the price responses for these outsourcing imports.  
Use of these cost measures enables me to verify that U.S. 9802 assembly imports 
between 1991 to 2000 exhibited a number of pricing regularities.  First, only twenty to 
forty percent of the changes in production costs were passed through to product prices. 
                                                           
3 See Jones and Kierkowski (1990), Arndt (2001) and Deardorff (2001).    3
More notably, the degree of production cost pass-through differed across country 
suppliers.  The pass-through was highest for products assembled in countries that had 
more highly, and likely more diversely, educated workforces.  There was also a weak 
positive relationship between the capital-intensity of the industry, and the degree of 
production cost pass-through.  Finally trade costs were generally passed-through at a 
higher rate than assembly costs, suggesting that firms can pass through costs that are 
commonly borne by all producers to a greater degree than they pass through idiosyncratic 
cost increases.   
The prices chosen by producers of U.S. 9802 imports also responded to the prices 
selected by competing assemblers in other countries.  A ten percent increase in prices 
chosen by competitors resulted in a two to four percent increase in prices chosen.  In 
addition, the responsiveness to competitor prices differed across industries in a manner 
related to industry differences in capital-intensity: prices were strongly correlated with 
competitors’ prices in capital-intense industries, while there was little correlation for 
industries that were not capital-intense.  Making the reasonable assumption that industry 
capital-intensity is correlated with matching costs and information uncertainty, this 
evidence suppports theories in which matching and information gathering problems lead 
to differential trade elasticities.  Furthermore, to the extent that capital-intensity drives 
firms to choose intra-firm rather than arm’s length transactions, it suggests that the 
identity of traders in international transactions has implications for trade prices.
4    
                                                           
4 Antras(2003) provides a model based on difficulties in contracting to explain the prevalence of intra-firm 
trade in capital-intense industries, and for capital abundant countries.  However, while Antras shows how 
capital will affect the mode of trade relationships, he does not explore whether the methods selected 
influence other transaction characteristics that may affect country welfare.    4
These findings contribute to the growing empirical literature in international 
trade, which shows how the identity of traders and the features of trading relationships 
affect trade outcomes.  Other work in this vein includes Feenstra and Hanson’s (2001) 
examination Hong Kong entrepot trader markups.  Feenstra and Hanson find that 
variation in mark-ups, both across products and across countries, is consistent with an 
economic story in which entrepot traders add value, by providing quality sorting services 
for Chinese-origin products.  Another example is the work of Besedes and Prusa (2004) 
which shows that heterogeneity in the duration of trading relationships is consistent with 
the predictions from Rauch and Watson’s (2003) model of trading relationships.  In 
particular, most trade relationships appear to start small, suggesting that search costs 
cause traders to test  suppliers first, only expanding their order volume once the 
supplier’s reliability is ascertained. 
  The rest of this paper is structured as follows.  Section two describes 
characteristics of 9802 outsourcing activities to help provide an overview of the 
outsourcing relationships that are examined in this paper.  Section 3 provides a model of 
pricing, and the associated regression framework.  It also develops detailed measures of 
cost which are based on the procedural features of the 9802 program. The empirical 
analysis in section four quantifies how production costs, trade costs and competitor prices 
affected the prices of 9802 imports.  It also examines the importance industry and country 
characteristics for these responses and discusses their economic implications.  The paper 
ends with a brief conclusion.      5
2.  Overseas Assembly and the 9802 program 
  To gain insight into outsourcing relationships I use data from the US program 
often referred to as the Overseas Assembly Provision, which is codified in section 9802 
of the current harmonized system (HS) of tariffs.  The 9802 program is designed to assist 
firms that use U.S.-origin parts or materials in their overseas assembly operations, by 
providing a tariff exemption for the U.S.-origin parts and materials contained in the final 
products.
5 While the Overseas Assembly Provision, or 9802, comprises only one strand 
of outsourcing activities – it does not capture U.S. assembly of foreign parts, or overseas 
contract manufacturing that is based on U.S. designs and specifications – it represents a 
non-negligible portion of U.S. trade.  Almost 8.5 percent of all U.S. imports during the 
sample period, 1991-2000, entered through the 9802 program.  In comparison with the 
broad outsourcing measures presented in Hummels, Ishii and Yi (2001) or Yi (2003), 
9802 outsourcing did not grow more rapidly than overall trade.  However, the general 
decline in U.S. manufacturing activity may explain why this form of outsourcing, which 
is based on the use of U.S. parts and materials, did not grow faster than U.S. trade.   
  The major benefit of examining 9802 activities, is that the import data enable one 
to observe outsourcing relationships at the product level.  During the sample period, the 
U.S. imported 4,676 distinct 8-digit HS (HS8) products through the 9802 program.  Table 
1 displays the country composition for these import transactions.  Geographical proximity 
appears to have played an important role in determining 9802 participation.  While U.S. 
9802 imports arrived from 182 different countries, many countries had only a slight 
participation in the program.  In contrast, Canada and Mexico were the most frequent 
                                                           
5 See Hanson (1997) to see a description of the program’s evolution.    6
participants, registering 3,518 and 7,940 unique (HS8-product)-year transactions, 
respectively. 
  Measured by frequency, the majority of 9802 transactions involved assembly in a 
developing country.  If development is defined by membership in the OECD, only 19% 
of the positive HS8-year pairs involved developed country activity.  If development is 
defined instead by country educational attainment averaging six or more years, 37% of 
the positive HS8-year import observations were shipped from developed countries.
  To provide a snapshot of the industry composition of overseas assembly, Table 2 
displays 9802 activity for 2-digit HS industries (HS2).  When the data are sorted by the 
value of U.S. inputs in the 9802 products, the top three 9802 outsourcing industries were 
electrical machinery (85), transportation equipment (87), and apparel and clothing, not 
knitted or crocheted (62).
6 For each of the HS2 categories, the table also lists the identity 
of the primary country supplier, where the primary supplier is defined as the country that 
shipped the largest total value of 9802 products in that HS2 category.  This cut of the data 
also suggests that the location of 9802 activities is greatly influenced by geographical 
proximity.  Of the thirty largest 9802 industries, either Mexico or Canada was the prime 
location for nineteen.  However, more distant country sources do top the list for some 
industries.  The fact that the biggest supplier for footwear (64) was Malaysia, imitation 
jewelry (71) was Hong Kong, and clocks and watches (91) was Switzerland, suggests that 
production decisions are also influenced by traditional notions of comparative advantage.  
                                                           
6   These are followed by, non-electrical machinery (84), apparel and clothing, knitted or crocheted (61), 
Optical, photographic, cinematographic, measuring, checking, precision, medical or surgical instruments 
and apparatus (90), Aircraft and spacecraft (88), and footwear (64).  Table 2 is based on activity in 1993 to 
prevent the possibility that the composition was affected by Mexico’s joining the NAFTA.    7
Finally, to characterize input usage Table 2 reports the U.S. percentage, which is 
defined as the percentage of total product value attributable to U.S. parts and materials.  
In order to reap the tariff benefits of the 9802 program, firms are required to record the 
portion of product value that derives from dutiable 9802 import as opposed to non-
dutiable U.S. components and parts.  The benefit of using these declarations is that one 
can observe the relative reliance on foreign inputs at a product-country level, rather than 
making an estimate that relies on input-output tables, and the undesirable assumption that 
imported inputs are used in production in a proportion that is exactly equal to ratio of 
imports relative to domestic consumption. The average U.S. percentage for products in 
the sample of 9802 imports was 36%.  A cross-industry comparison of the U.S. 
percentage shows that industries varied dramatically in their relative reliance on U.S. 
inputs.  This variation could be driven by a number of factors, including cross-industry 
differences in U.S. comparative advantage, in organizational form, or in the relative 
importance of parts and assembly.  Cross product tariff differences should also influence 
the incentive to use U.S.-origin parts and materials.  However, while the U.S. percentage 
of product value and MFN tariffs have the expected positive correlation, it is only 0.075.   
Because the value of U.S. percentage varies greatly across products and countries, 
it is possible to construct detailed cost measures at the product-country level that are 
based on variation in production, tariff and transportation costs.   For example, consider a 
range of products produced in Mexico through the 9802 program.  Each product i is 
characterized by the percentage U.S. content associated with its production, or αus,ic.
7  If 
Mexican wages rise, production cost increases will be especially pronounced for those 
                                                           
7 The subscript c refers generally to the country of assembly, which in this case is Mexico.    8
products with the highest percentage (1- αus,ic) of their production activities located in 
Mexico.  A high percentage of activity in Mexico is also costly for those products that 
face the highest U.S. import duties.  In contrast, products characterized by a high value of 
(1-  αus,ic) benefit from lower transportation costs since there is less back and forth 
shipment of U.S.-origin parts and material.   
 
3.  A model of pricing decisions 
  In this section I provide a model of outsourcing prices that I modify to examine 
issues related to the roles of information and search in outsourcing relationships.  I begin 
by introducing measures of outsourcing costs that account for the unique input and tariff 
structure of imports shipped through the 9802 program.  I then modify a Bertrand model 
of competition in internationally differentiated goods to relate the pricing of 9802 imports 
to a producer’s outsourcing costs as well as the pricing decisions of its competitors.   
Finally, I add interaction terms to the common pass-through framework to test whether 
price responses are related to country or industry characteristics, and more importantly 
whether such interactions are related to theories based on information and matching. 
 
3.1 Production 
  Following Mendez (1993), 9802 assembly is modeled as a Leontieff production 
process. To produce product i in country c, 9802 producers combine a fixed bundle of 
U.S. inputs with a fixed bundle of foreign inputs and assembly.  To characterize input 
bundles, I assume that 9802 assembly involves a set of tasks on the unit interval that must 
be completed in sequence.   A firm’s decision to participate in 9802 indicates that the    9
U.S. has comparative advantage in the early stage tasks, while the foreign country has 
comparative advantage in the later tasks and assembly.  If the point on the unit interval at 
which U.S. processing ends and foreign production begins is denoted by βic, and each 
task requires physical labor input Li, then U.S. input requirements are given by βic*Li 
while the foreign input requirement is (1- βic)* Li.    Assume the price of U.S. inputs is 
given by wus, while the U.S. dollar price of foreign inputs is wc.  If U.S. inputs are 
transported to the foreign assembler at ad valorem cost gic, the resulting production cost 
when product i is assembled in country c is: 
(1) Cic = [βic*wus* (1+gic) + (1- βic)*wc]*Li. 
Since assembly countries differ in their abilities and distance from the U.S., the value of 
βic will not be the same for all countries involved in the assembly of good i.
8    
  When 9802 products are shipped from the assembly country to the U.S. two 
further costs arise.  First, the appropriate U.S. import tariff τi is applied to the foreign 
contribution to product value, (1- βic)*wc*Li.  In addition, the return of the completed 
product to the U.S. incurs the ad valorem shipping cost gic.    
As the description of production indicates, the underlying cost of 9802 imports 
will differ across assembly locations for a number of reasons, including cross-country 
differences in factor and transportation costs for the movement of parts and materials.  
Cross-country variation is also generated by differences in production techniques that 
cause the Leontieff input choices to vary by location as dictated by skills, endowments 
and production costs. Finally, while time subscripts have been excluded for notational 
                                                           
8 Distance matters not only due to transportation costs, which are directly included in the measure of costs, 
but also due to time costs associated with distance, as highlighted by Hummels (2001) and Evans and 
Harrigan (2003).    10
simplicity, the costs related to overseas assembly will also change over time as wages, 
transportation costs and tariffs change. 
 
3.2 Demand 
  To model pricing decisions, I assume that product market competition is Bertrand.  
Each country produces a unique variety of the outsourced good, which is an imperfect 
substitute for the products arriving from other country locations. This implies that the 
producer of any particular good faces product demand qic = d(Pic
C, Pic
C*, Ei), where the 
demand for each product is negatively related to the producer’s own choice of consumer 
price Pic
C, and positively related to the price vector of its competitors’ consumer prices 
Pic
C* and to overall expenditure Ei on product i.   
  Although firm profit depends the producer price, product demand depends on the 
consumer price.  If we now define αus,ic as the U.S. share of product value that is exempt 
from tariff, the relationship between the consumer and producer (Pic




C =  [Pic
P *(1+gic) + (1-αus,ic)* Pic
P * τi]. 
 
This can be rearranged to yield, 
 
(3’) Pic
P  =  Pic
C * [ (1+gic) +  (1-αus,ic)* τi ]
-1. 
       
Firms now choose Pic
P to maximize profits: 
                                                           
9 The U.S.-origin contribution to product value is given by:  αus,ic = [βic*wus* (1+gic)]/[βic*wus* (1+gic) + (1- 
βic)*wc].    11
 
(4)  π = Pic
C *  [ (1+gic) + (1-αus,ic)* τi]
-1* d(Pic
C, Pic
C*, Ei) - Cic*d(Pic
C, Pic
C*, Ei).                             
 
This generates the familiar first order condition: 
 
(5) Pic
C (1+ 1/ η) =  [ (1+gic) +  (1-αus,ic)* τi ]*Cic.             
 
Prices are determined by a markup over marginal cost.  The marginal cost has two 
components: trade costs are given by  [(1+gic) +  (1-αus,ic)* τi ], while marginal production 
costs are represented by Cic.  The markup is determined by the elasticity of demand (η) 
for product i.  For purposes of estimation, we can follow Feenstra (1989) and arrive at the 
reduced form relationship (6).   
 
(6) Pic
C = Г [ {(1+gic) + (1-αus,ic)* τi }*Cic ),  Pic*, Ei ]   
 
Restoring time subscripts and adopting a log-linear form generates the familiar pass-
through regression framework: 
 
(7)  lnPict
C =  α + β1ln([ (1+gict) +  (1-αus,ic)* τit]) + β2ln(Cict) +  γln(Pict*) + δlnEit + εict      
                
However, this equation needs to be modified since recent work on import price data 
demonstrates that cross country differences in quality are present even when trade data    12
are disaggregated to the fine product level.
10  To account for unobserved differences in 
product quality that are correlated with country development I add a measure of 
development Dc to the basic specification.  This yields the primary estimating equation 
that is to analyze the prices of outsourcing imports. 
 
(7’)  lnPict
C =  α + β1ln([(1+gict)+ (1-αus,ic)* τit])+ β2ln(Cict) +γln(Pict*) +δlnEit +λlnDc + εict   
     
As in the pass-through literature, the coefficients β1 and β2 are both expected to be in the 
interval [0,1], which run the gamut from no pass-through of cost changes to complete 
pass-through of any changes in cost.
 11   In addition, the coefficients on competitor prices 
γ and country development λ are both expected to be positive.     
 
3.3  Heterogeneous Product Responses 
  The primary estimating equation assumes that pass-through and market reactions 
are the same for all products in the sample.  However, these assumptions fail if market 
characteristics condition the degree of competition in product markets.  Such differential 
product elasticities are a feature of Rauch and Trindade’s (2003) model of matching in 
which improved information increases the elasticity of substitution between 
internationally differentiated product varieties, since improved information enables firms 
to rule out unacceptably poor matches before conducting international partner searches.  
                                                           
10  See Hummels & Skiba (2002), Hummels and Irwin (2002) and Schott (2003). 
11  Blonigen and Haynes (2002) predict and discover pass-through rates exceeding one in magnitude for 
products that are subject to anti-dumping treatment. However this exception is caused by the incentives 
created by the administration of anti-dumping cases.   
      See Goldberg and Knetter (1997) for a thorough discussion of the literature on pass-through.  While I 
examine the pass-through of costs converted to dollars, rather than the separate exchange rate and cost 
terms, this is motivated by the idea that the majority of cost changes are driven by currency movements 
rather than underlying changes in country production costs denominated in national currency.    13
While Rauch and Trindade explore the implications of informational improvements for 
the evolution of trade relationships, their ideas can be applied to comparisons of trading 
relationships across products. In particular, the effect of informational uncertainty in 
reducing product trade elasticities should be greatest for those products where 
informational uncertainty is the greatest.  While Rauch and Trindade provide a model of 
international joint ventures, it seems reasonable to expect that informationally-based 
matching frictions will be every bit as critical to the formation of overseas outsourcing 
relationships.   
Grossman and Helpman’s (2004) work provides further reasons to expect 
different pricing responses for different product outsourcing relationships.  When search 
costs are sufficiently high, Northern firms may seek partners in the high-wage North, if 
the costs of search and adaptation have hindered the entry of potential partners in the 
South.  In particular, a greater number of Northern firms to attempt a Northern search, 
since thinness of potential Southern partners reduces the probability of a successful 
match, and consequently expected profits associated with search in the low-wage South. 
While Grossman and Helpman (2004) focus on a particular equilibrium in which partner 
search occurs in both the North and the South, one can imagine extending their 
framework to a multiple country setting with wage shocks.  In particular, if the relative 
wage of one country’s workers rise, the interest in seeking a replacement country location 
for assembly is likely to be greatest for products in industries that involve the lowest 
search and modification costs.  
  Since there are no straightforward measures of search costs or uncertainty by 
industry, I assume that the costs of search and modification, as well as search uncertainty,     14
are highest for technologically sophisticated industries and for partner searches in more 
highly skilled countries.  Search and adaptation costs are likely to be especially high in 
sophisticated industries, for example, since these industries are likely to be characterized 
by a large set of search criteria whose presence is difficult to verify.  To examine whether 
pricing decisions respond in a fashion that is consistent with the notion of costly or 
uncertain search, I add interaction terms to examine whether industry capital-intensity Ki 
influences the degree of response to competitor price changes or the degree of production 
cost pass-through.   
 
(8)  lnPict
C =  α + (β1 + β1K*ln(Ki))*ln([(1+gict)+ (1-αus,ic)* τit])+ (β2 + β2K*ln(Ki))*ln(Cict) 
  +     ( γ +  γK*ln(Ki))*ln(Pict*) + δlnEit  + θ*ln(Ki) +λlnDc + εict        
 
  The choice of specification (8) is further motivated by work on the organizational 
form of international production.  A notable contribution in this area is Antras’s (2003) 
work demonstrating how greater reliance on intra-firm trade transactions can emerge to 
solve contracting problems in settings that involve more capital.  Including capital-
intensity terms in specification (8) allows me to explore whether capital-intensity, which 
correlated with differences in the organizational form of trade transactions, is also related 
to transaction characteristics that may affect country welfare. 
    Of course, industry capital-intensity is only one transaction characteristic that 
affects search and modification costs as well as incentives that affect the organizational 
form of trade.  Another way to proxy matching issues is to use education as a measure of 
skill.  While lower levels of education generally comprise a common set of skills, higher    15
education levels are likely to result in more heterogeneous skill outcomes in the educated 
populace.
12  When a firm seeks more highly skilled workers, its managers are likely to 
face a more difficult search, since their criteria are no longer based on a minimum 
education, but on identifying workers who possess training in particular skills and 
methods.  To account for this possibility I also investigate the effects of including 
interaction terms based on country education HEc. 
 
(9)  lnPict
C =  αic + (β1 + β1HE*HEc)*ln([(1+gict)+ (1-αus,ic)* τit])+ (β2 + β2HE*HEc)*ln(Cict) 




4.  Results 
  I estimate the pricing relationship using both OLS and panel regression 
techniques that control for serial correlation.  The findings support the price predictions 
emerging from a Bertrand model of competition.  In particular, unit import prices for 
9802 products are positively related to production and trade costs. They are also 
positively related to the prices charged by competitors.  In addition, price levels and 





                                                           
12  While low grades of education commonly provide students with an ability to read or do calculations, 
higher education is more likely to be characterized by differentiation.  (E.g., think of college educated 
workers who choose not only majors, but subspecialties, or highly skilled technicians who have received 
training in particular techniques and procedures.)      16
4.1 Data 
  My primary data for this project follow U.S. 9802 imports between 1991 and 
2000.  To quantify price responses in an outsourcing context, I use unit import values for 
9802 imports as the dependent variable.  These data are also used to construct competitor 
prices P* which are defined as the average unit import value for competing country 
producers in the same HS8 industry in that year.  Finally, I use the U.S. and foreign 
content declarations to create measures of αus,ic, which are fundamental to  construction of 
the production and trade cost measures.  The data appendix provides more details 
regarding the construction of the data set, including the sources for the other variables 
used in the analysis. 
 
4.2 Estimation 
Table 3 presents the benchmark estimates for price equation (7’).   The estimated 
coefficients uniformly show that 9802 import prices were positively related to   
production costs, though the implied degree of pass-through was only ten to forty 
percent.  The regressions also imply that trade costs were incompletely passed through.  
In each of the specifications the pass-through of trade costs was somewhat higher than 
the pass-through of production costs.  The difference in estimated pass-through of 
producer costs versus trade costs is statistically distinct, though the weakest results which 
are displayed in column (3) are only statistically different at the 6% level.  The greater    17
pass through of trade costs suggests that firms are able to pass-through common cost 
changes to a greater extent than idiosyncratic cost changes.
13   
The results in Table 3 also show that there was a strong positive relationship 
between prices charged by 9802 assemblers and the prices charged by their competitors.  
The OLS regressions imply that assemblers incorporated forty percent of competitor 
price changes in their own prices, while the later panel regressions in columns (2), (3) 
and (4) imply that 9802 producers mimicked twenty-five percent of their competitors’ 
price changes. 
Similar to Schott (2003), Hummels and Irwin (2002) and Hummels and Klenow 
(2002), 9802 import prices were highly correlated with country development.  The 
positive and significant coefficient on the OECD variable indicates that even within fine 
8-digit HS products, those imported from developed countries commanded higher prices.  
The most likely interpretation of the development coefficient is that developed countries 
produced higher quality varieties of the HS8 goods.  To examine whether the correlation 
between assembler country development and product import values was robust, I turned 
to two alternative development measures - an indicator variable for highly educated 
countries, and the log of country per capita income.
14  The coefficients on alternative 
development measures were always positive and significant, while the remaining 
coefficients in the price regression were qualitatively unchanged by the choice of 
development measure.  
                                                           
13 Gron and Swenson (2000) find a similar phenomenon in U.S. car prices, while Besanko, Dranove, and 
Shanley (2001) provide empirical evidence showing that firms pass-through common shocks to a greater 
degree than they pass through idiosyncratic cost shocks.   
14  Following Riker and Brainard (1997), countries are defined as “highly educated” if the average 
education level for the country is six or more years.    18
The only coefficient that changed in magnitude as the definition of development 
was changed was the coefficient on production cost.  The coefficient magnitude rose 
when development was measured by country education, and fell when country 
development was represented by per capita GDP.  Since per-capita GDP is highly 
correlated with wages, and hence, country costs, the coefficient on per-capita GDP may 
have picked up some of the effects of production costs, thus causing the estimated 
coefficient on production cost to fall in size.  In contrast, when country development was 
measured by the country education variable, the apparent pass-through of production 
costs rose.  This result is sensible since accounting for country education helps to control 
for differences in country costs that were related to otherwise unmeasured differences in 
worker quality. 
Recent work on outsourcing such as Grossman and Helpman (2004) emphasizes 
that the initiation and development of outsourcing relationships can be complicated by 
issues related to partner search.  Firms will only seek outsourcing partners, rather than 
completing projects in house, when an outsourcing relationship is expected to yield 
higher profits.  In this context the relative attractiveness of outsourcing relationships 
depends on the difficulty and cost of finding a partner in addition to the relative costs of 
outsourcing versus in house production.  On the industry dimension, I assume that the 
difficulty and cost of finding a partner is highest for products that require complex and 
highly specified production skills.   
Before turning to the full capital interaction specification (8), I first examined 
how the estimated pass-through changed if controls for capital were included in the 
regression.  To proxy production skill-intensity and specificity, I added the capital output    19
ratio as a control in the regressions displayed in table 4.
15   The results in the first three 
columns of table 4 show that industry capital-intensity was highly correlated with the unit 
values of 9802 imports.  In addition, the results show that magnitude of the effect of 
industry capital-intensity on the unit import values differed for developed and developing 
countries.  The most notable effect of including capital-intensity in the regressions, is that 
the estimated production cost pass-through rises somewhat, to roughly 28 percent.  In 
contrast, the magnitude of the coefficient on competitor prices remains unchanged.   
The one coefficient that becomes unstable when industry capital-intensity is 
directly included in the estimating equation is the coefficient measuring the pass-through 
of trade costs.  The most likely reason for the instability of the trade cost term was the 
underlying correlation between industry capital-intensity and the level of tariffs, which 
are a component of trade costs.  In particular, U.S. tariffs were higher in less capital-
intense industries.
16  When capital-intensity is directly included in the estimating 
equation, the capital-intensity term may pick up some of the variation that was related to 
tariffs, consequently changing the apparent magnitude of the trade cost coefficient.  
  To examine whether industry capital-intensity influenced the degree of response 
to competitor price changes or the degree of production cost pass-through, I estimated 
interaction specification (8).  The estimates reveal a positive coefficient on the   
interaction between industry capital-intensity and competitor prices, indicating that the 
tendency to mimic competitor country price increases was positively related to industry 
                                                           
15 The number of observations declines since it is not possible to map all HS 8 codes to a 1987-value SIC 
code, which is needed to connect the product data to industry variables. 
16 In this sample, the regression of an industry’s tariff rate on the industry’s capital-intensity and time 
yields:  Tariff Rateit = .185(.015)-.031(.001)*ln(average KY)i - .0016(.0002)*yr.  This regression is based 
on the 24,253 unique HS8 product-year combinations.    20
capital-intensity.  If capital-intensity increases search uncertainty, or search costs, then 
producers in those industries may have felt confident that they could match their 
competitors’ price increases without losing their assembly work to other country 
suppliers.  
To examine whether the availability of alternative outsourcing partners was 
conditioned by industry capital-intensity, I regressed the count of competitors on 
measures of industry capital-intensity.
17  The negative coefficient on average industry 
capital-intensity shown in specification (1) documents that the number of competing 
source countries was negatively related to the capital-intensity of 9802 products.   
 
The Effect of Capital-intensity on the Number of Countries Providing 
Products:  Negative Binomial Regressions 
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To further explore how capital-intensity conditioned the number of competing 
9802 country suppliers, I created separate competitor counts for OECD and non-OECD 
suppliers.  This distinction makes sense if developed countries were better suited for 
                                                           
17 “Competitors” were measured by the count of countries that provided a particular HS8 product for at 
least one of the years between 1991 and 2000.    21
some assembly tasks, while developing countries were better suited for others.  When the 
count of competitors was defined by OECD membership status, as in specifications (2) 
and (3), the regression results show that capital-intensity exerted a much greater barrier to 
the presence of non-OECD suppliers than it did to the presence of competing OECD 
suppliers.  This could mean that products assembled in non-OECD locations were better 
substitutes for each other, than were products assembled in OECD locations.   
Alternatively, if OECD countries were more heavily engaged in the most skill-intensive 
activities of skill-using capital-intense industries, they may have faced less risk of 
displacement based on costs. 
Since the capital-intensity data are only available through 1996 it is not feasible to 
track the connection between yearly changes in capital-intensity and changes in 
competitor counts for the entire sample period.  However, examination of the time-series 
data for 1991-1996 in specification (4), shows that the number of countries providing 
overseas assembly assistance declined for U.S. industries that became more capital-
intense. 
  Each of the auxiliary regressions demonstrates that the presence of competing 
country locations was smaller in capital-intense industries.  This may explain why firms 
in more capital-intense industries were more likely to match their competitor’s price 
changes.  If these producers raised their prices, the greater difficulties and requirements 
involved in successfully switching partners in capital-intense industries may have 
insulated them from displacement by competitors from other countries.  Alternatively, the 
correlation may have arisen from market power, if an industry’s capital-intensity elevates 
market power.   This view of competition bears resemblance to Feenstra, Gagnon and    22
Knetter’s (1996) finding that exchange rate pass-through for passenger cars was higher 
for producers with higher market share.  While it would be attractive to run a comparable 
analysis to test whether their market share model explains pricing relationships in 9802 
data, the lack of similarly disaggregated U.S. industry production data for each of the 
HS8 products precludes the creation of appropriate market share terms.
18 
An alternative way to look for evidence that industry matching matters is to 
include industry skill requirements rather than capital-intensity in the regressions.  Table 
5 does this by examining whether industry skill requirements affected product prices or 
price sensitivity.  To measure industry skill intensity, I defined the skilled wage 
percentage at the industry level as [non-production worker wages]i/[Total wages]i.  
Columns (1) and (2) begin the inquiry by examining the direct effects of including skill 
measures in the regressions.  The coefficients on the skill measures show that the unit 
values for 9802 imports were higher in industries that were characterized by a relatively 
high skilled wage percentage.  In addition, unit import values were higher for products 
assembled in countries with more highly educated workforces. 
Grossman and Helpman’s work on outsourcing shows how low search costs 
enable firms to conduct more intensive searches, and how in general equilibrium the 
expansion of search efforts will create a “thick markets” externality, due to the greater 
entry of potential partners.  In the 9802 context, we might expect that the search costs for 
highly skilled assembly partners would have been the highest in countries that had highly 
                                                           
18 The data in this sample do reveal a high correlation between capital-intensity and 9802 market share, 
defined as a country’s share of 9802 product exports in a given industry.  In this sample, OLS regression of 
a country’s average market share in an industry on the industry’s average capital-intensity and a set of 
country dummies yielded:  Average Market Shareic = .216(.006)*ln(average KY)i + ∑CC. When I estimated  
the regression using  panel techniques and random effects for country-industry pairs , or Market Shareict = 
177(.006)*ln(KY)it  + εict,  the results show that for the years of available data to 1996, that country market 
shares grew as the capital-intensity of the U.S. rose.    23
educated workforces, since the types of skills matter as much as the level of education.  If 
this is the source of the “thick markets” externalities, then country education should 
matter the most for those industries that most heavily utilized skilled workers.  To test 
this idea, columns (3) and (4) added an interaction term multiplying the industry skilled 
wage percentage by an indicator variable denoting whether the country’s population was 
highly educated.  In support of the “thick markets” idea, the strong positive coefficient on 
the interaction term suggests that unit values were particularly high when a skilled 
industry product was produced in a more highly educated country.   
Finally, I estimated interaction equation (9) to determine whether country 
education levels affected the pricing responses.  The results show that country education 
levels influenced the ability of assemblers to pass-through production costs to prices.  
Column (6) of Table 5 suggests that assemblers located in low education countries could 
only pass-through thirty percent of their production costs changes.  In contrast, producers 
located in highly educated countries were able to pass-through 97 percent of their 
production cost changes.  
To further investigate the effects of education, I replaced the indicator variable for 
highly educated countries with the actual educational attainment for each country’s adult 
population aged 25 or over.  Overall, the results reported in Table 6 echo the findings 
from Table 5.  However, the use of a direct schooling measure allows one to ask whether 
an additional year of education had a uniform effect on low and high education countries.  
In particular, did an additional year of schooling provide a greater boost to the product 
value of high or low education countries?  To look at this issue, column (4) adds an 
interaction term to measure the benefits of extra education for those countries that had 6 
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years or greater education. The results show that extra education proved especially 
valuable to producers in more educated locations. While a 10% increase in educational 
attainment for countries whose attainment was less than 6 years, implied a 3.5% increase 
in product prices, a 10% increase in educational attainment was correlated with a 7.5% 
increase in product prices for products imported from countries whose residents averaged 
6 or more years of education.   
As before, I tested for evidence consistent with Grossman and Helpman style 
“thick market” externalities by adding an interaction term to the regression reported in 
column (3), which multiplied the industry skilled wage measure with country educational 
attainment.
19  The strong positive coefficient on the new interaction term, indicates that 
product prices were especially high when a skill-intensive product was assembled in a 
country with a highly educated workforce. 
Finally, I tested whether the level of education affected the pass through of 
production costs.  As column (6) of Table 6 shows, the ability to pass through production 
cost changes to import prices was strongly related to the education level of the assembly 
location.  The coefficients imply that the median country was able to pass through 25% of 
its cost changes.  In contrast, a country in the top 25%, by education, was able pass 
through 94% of its cost changes, while a country in the top 10% was able to pass through 
99%.   
                                                           
19   I assume here that the supply of high skilled assemblers is greater in countries that have highly educated 
workers, and that the cost of locating a match is highest for industries that require skilled workers.  The 
effect may be more complicated if, as in Grossman and Helpman (2003), the compensation paid to the 
foreign assembler depends on the assemblers’ outside options, which are themselves correlated with 
education levels.  The indicator variables HEc in equation (9) are now replaced with HEc*ln(Education)c.    25
4.3 Robustness Checks 
To check the stability of the pass-through results, I ran a number of robustness 
checks.  In each case, I employed the same estimating equation, as that reported in 
column (2) of Table 3. 
  I began by running individual regressions for each of the HS2 industries rather 
than the pooled sample, to learn whether there was significant heterogeneity in pass-
through across industries. However, while estimation at the HS2 industry level does 
reveals heterogeneity in the value of the production cost pass-through coefficient the 
median value for the HS2 production cost coefficients was 0.229, which was very similar 
to the result in the pooled sample.  In addition, since textiles and footwear are believed to 
be among the most footloose industries, I also estimated the pass-through equation for 
this group of products (HS2 chapters 61 to 64).  It is interesting to note that the 
production cost pass-through for those sectors was a bit lower, with a coefficient of 
0.158.  However, this degree of pass-through was not statistically distinct from the full 
sample value of 0.200.  
A second question is whether the production cost measures, which were based on 
country price deflators, rather than country-industry deflators, provided too little variation 
in the production cost to get good identification.  While it would have been desirable to 
use industrial production indices for each country-industry pair, no such comprehensive 
and internationally comparable measure exists.  However, to get an idea whether 
measurement error in the cost term affected the results, I replaced the general U.S. price 
measure used in the creation of the production cost measure with 4-digit SIC U.S. price 
deflators from Bartlesman, Becker and Gray.  Since their data end with 1996, estimation    26
is limited to the years 1991-1996.  However, when I run the regression for those years 
with the old cost measure, and the modified cost measure, the coefficients on the 
production cost terms are 0.253(.048) and 0.339(.047), respectively.  While the degree of 
measured pass-through is a bit higher with the new cost measure, the similarity of the 
results seems to suggest that measurement error did not dramatically affect the results. 
It may be noted that both regressions based on 1991-1996 prices yielded 
production cost coefficients that were slightly higher than those arriving from estimation 
covering the full sample period, 1991-2000.  This may indicate that the degree of 
production cost pass-through declined over time.  However, when I added interaction 
terms to equation (8) which replaced the capital-intensity interactions with interactions 
based on a time trend, the interaction terms failed to reveal any time trend in the pass 
through of production costs. 
Another question is whether the availability of alternative trade programs, such as 
the NAFTA, affected the results.
20  The phase-in of alternative trade programs is only 
problematic if there was a correlation between pricing behavior, and the identity of those 
producers who decided to enter their U.S. imports through NAFTA rather than 9802. To 
provide a crude indication whether NAFTA participation affected the results, I estimated 
the pricing equation without Mexico or Canada.  In their absence, the estimated 
production cost pass-through coefficient is 0.259(.003), which is again very similar to the 
estimate in the full sample.  This suggests that there were no systematic differences 
between the pricing behavior of firms that left the 9802 program in lieu of NAFTA trade 
                                                           
20   Provisions regarding the general custom’s user’s fee continued to provide benefits to 9802 participants, 
even after NAFTA was in force.  In addition, U.S. tariffs on Mexican imports were generally non-zero 
during the sample period, since they were undergoing the phase-in process.     27
 provisions and the pricing behavior of firms that continued to participate in 9802. 
  Finally, I experimented with changes in the expenditure term in the regressions.  
While the regressions are run with HS8 expenditures as a control, it may be preferable to 
use more aggregated measures of expenditure.  However, when I ran the regressions with 
HS6 or HS4 expenditure instead, the primary coefficients of interest were hardly 
changed, suggesting that the choice of expenditure measure had no effect on the 
estimated pass-through or emulation effects. 
 
 
5.  Conclusion 
   I document pricing regularities in U.S. 9802 imports to provide stylized facts 
related to outsourcing decisions, and to examine whether the pricing responses are 
consistent with economic theories of international trade that feature search and 
modification costs or search uncertainty.   
Pricing decisions for U.S. 9802 outsourcing imports show that changes in 
production costs were only partially passed through to import prices; the full sample 
results imply that a country assembling 9802 products was only able to pass-through 20 
to 40 percent of any production cost shock it faced.  However, assemblers located in 
countries with highly educated workforces were able to pass-through a much larger 
percentage of production cost changes than were assemblers located in countries whose 
workers were less educated.  The results also show that the degree of price response to 
competitor price changes was magnified for products produced by capital-intense 
industries.  If search costs and search uncertainty are increasing in industry capital-   28
intensity, then the greater emulation of competitor price changes is consistent with 
informational theories in which the elasticity of substitutions between internationally 
differentiated products is diminished by search costs and difficulties.  In additions, since 
auxiliary regressions show that there were fewer competing country suppliers in capital-
intense industries, it appears that capital-intensity was negatively related to Grossman and 
Helpman (2004) style market thickness externalities, in the market for 9802 sourcing 
locations. 
  There are a number of reasons to be cautious in applying the lessons from 9802 
imports to the full range of overseas outsourcing relationships.  Since 9802 is designed to 
promote the use of U.S.-origin parts in foreign assembly, assembly represents a large 
portion of many foreign countries’ contributions.  If 9802 assembly tasks are well defined 
and simpler to match and conduct than other forms of overseas outsourcing, then the 
effects of search costs or search uncertainty are likely to be much larger in other 
outsourcing contexts.        29
MEXICO 7940 VIETNAM 284 MAURITIUS 45
CANADA 3518 NICARAGUA 225 URUGUAY 44
CHINA 2993 BANGLADESH 219 BOLIVIA 41
DOMINICAN 
REPUBLIC
2434 TURKEY 212 MONACO 40
HONGKONG 2103 BARBADOS 191 THE CZECH 
REPUBLIC
38
KOREA 1698 NETHERLANDS 190 BELARUS 38
TAIWAN 1686 BRAZIL 190 GREECE 34
INDIA 1602 SWITZERLAND 188 FINLAND 33
COSTARICA 1580 IRELAND 169 NORWAY 33
COLOMBIA 1535 POLAND 155 NEW ZEALAND 32
GUATEMALA 1498 TRINIDAD AND 
TOBAGO
150 MONTSERRAT 31
ELSALVADOR 1437 PERU 136 VENEZUELA 30
PHILIPPINES 1326 PORTUGAL 126 LITHUANIA 29
JAPAN 1270 BELGIUM 123 OMAN 25
HONDURAS 1230 SPAIN 115 SLOVENIA 24
HAITI 1140 SWEDEN 109 SLOVAKIA 23
ITALY 1057 RUSSIA 101 DOMINICA 21
JAMAICA 718 AUSTRALIA 100 TUNISIA 20
UNITED 
KINGDOM
700 EGYPT 100 MALDIVE 
ISLANDS
19
THAILAND 649 UKRAINE 98 LESOTHO 18
GERMANY 595 PANAMA 98 MACEDONIA 17
INDONESIA 559 AUSTRIA 96 UZBEKISTAN 16
MALAYSIA 530 ST.VINCENT 95 BURMA 15
PAKISTAN 503 NETHERLANDS 
ANTILLES
95 MALTA 15
SRILANKA 503 ROMANIA 83 ARGENTINA 14
SINGAPORE 483 BELIZE 70 CROATIA 13
FRANCE 463 UNITED ARAB 
EMIRATES
65 SIERRA LEONE 11
MACAO 349 ISRAEL 64 KENYA 11
ST. LUCIA 327 DENMARK 59 QATAR 11
ECUADOR 318 MOROCCO 54 SOUTH AFRICA 11
ST.KITTS NEVIS 312 CHILE 50 PARAGUAY 10
GUYANA 302 BULGARIA 47 MOZAMBIQUE 10
HUNGARY 300 NEPAL 46 GRENADA 10
Table 1:  9802 Providers, 1991-2000
 
The table displays the number of distinct HS8 product-year observations of 9802 unit import 




    
Table 2:  9802 Sourcing Activity by HS Industry, 1993 




Value of 9802 
Imports 
($mill) 
 U.S. %  Largest Source 
Country 





Value of 9802 
Imports 
($mill) 
U.S. %  Largest Source 
Country 
85 14,255  6,910 48.5 Canada 91  98 30 31.1 Switzerland 
87 27,879  3,660 13.1 Canada 86  64 27 43.1 Canada 
62 3,840  2,131 55.5 Peru 48  36 19 51.2 Canada 
84 4,303  1,236 28.7 Canada 65  28 16 56.6 Canada 
61 1,331  977 73.4 Mexico 82  40 15 37.6 Taiwan
90 1,503  674 44.8 Canada 59  41 15 37.0 Canada
88 712  299 42.0 Canada 92  105 15 12.1 Japan
76 274  218 79.7 Canada 40  18 13 69.0 Mexico
64 1,135  194 17.1 Malaysia 89  84 12 12.0 Canada 
29 155  149 95.8 France 70  23 10 40.4 Canada 
63 204  124 61.0 Peru 44  21 9 44.2 Canada 
94 191  107 56.0 Canada 58  11 9 39.2 India
72 160  105 65.7 United  Kingdom 49  10 4 43.8 Mexico
73 268  97 36.3 Canada 69  16 4 25.7 Mexico
83 109  77 70.8 Mexico 56  5 4 67.3 Mexico
95 143  70 49.1 Mexico 93  15 4 20.8 Japan
39 114  69 60.9 Canada 30  8 3 33.8 Germany
71 72  61 85.6 Hong  Kong 28  5 3 49.8 Germany
37 116  58 50.3 Netherlands 54  2 2 77.8 China
74 63  48 76.6 Canada 36  4 2 39.3 Mexico
42 106  46 43.9 Mexico 81  3 2 57.9 Germany
96 65  34 53.7 China 68  2 1 68.0 Italy
Notes:  Largest Source Country denotes the country which had the largest total value shipped through 9802.  U.S. % is computed for each HS2 
category as, 100*[US Value of 9802 Imports]/ [Total Value of 9802 Imports]. 





Table 3:  The Effect of Costs and Competitor Prices on 9802 Prices 
 



























































Year and HS2 
Dummies 
Yes, Yes  Yes, No  Yes, No  Yes, No 
Rho   .347  .347  .347 
R2  .553 .362 .342 .343 
Observations  47,573 47,573 47,573 47,573 
Notes:  Standard Errors in ( ).  Regression (1) is estimated by OLS.  Regressions (2), (3), 
(4) are estimated by random effects panel methods which allow for a first-order 
autoregressive error term.    32
 
 
Table 4:  The Effect of Capital-intensity on Price Responses 
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Year and HS2 
Dummies 
Yes, Yes  Yes, Yes  Yes, No  Yes, Yes  Yes, No 
Rho     .394    .394 
R2  .548 .549 .350 .554 .354 
Observations  31,888 31,888 31,888 31,888 31,888 
Notes:  Standard Errors in ( ).  Regressions (1), (2), and (4) estimated by OLS.  
Regressions  (3), and (5) estimated by random effects panel methods which allow for a 
first-order autoregressive error term. 
 
 




Table 5:  The Effect of Country Education on Price Responses 
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Year and HS2 
Dummies 
Yes, Yes  Yes, No  Yes, Yes  Yes, No  Yes, Yes  Yes, No 
Rho   .394  .394  .394 
R2  .530 .313 .534 .319 .543 .333 
Observations  31,888 31,888 31,888 31,888 31,888 31,888 
Notes:  Standard Errors in ( ).  Regressions (1), (3), and (5) estimated by OLS.  
Regressions (2), (4), (6) estimated by random effects panel methods which allow for a 
first-order autoregressive error term. 




Table 6:  The Effect of Country Education Levels on Price Responses 
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Skilled Wage % * 
ln(Country 
Education) 
   6.628 
(.353) 













Year and HS2 
Dummies 
Yes, Yes  Yes, No  Yes, No  Yes, Yes  Yes, No  Yes, No 
Rho   .396  .396  .396  .396 
R
2  .532 .306 .318 .310 .547 .330 
Observations  30,868 30,868 30,868 30,868 30,868 30,868 
Notes:  Standard Errors in ( ). Columns (1) and (5) are estimated by OLS, while the 
remaining regressions in this table are estimated using random effects panel methods 









Data on U.S. 9802 imports for 1991-2000 were taken from United States International Trade 
Commission (USITC) trade data as reported in the December editions of the IM146A.  While the 
data are recorded at the 10-digit HS level, the 10-digit data were first aggregated to the 8-digit 
level.  The dependent variable for the analysis is the CIF unit value of imports, based on the 8-
digit aggregates.  Unit values were defined for each country-product year observation and 
calculated as, Unit Valuecit = [Import value]cit /[Import quantity]cit. The subscripts refer to country 
(c), product (i) and year (t), respectively. 
 
Competitor prices P* were given by the average price of similar 8-digit HS products imported 
from all other countries in that year through the 9802 program.  Expenditure was defined by 
overall spending for 9802 imports from all countries within an HS 8 grouping in the year, though 
other higher industry levels of aggregation were also tested for robustness. 
 
The 9802 data were also used to construct the U.S  percentage of product value, αus,ic, which is 
defined in footnote 9.  The U.S. percentage αus,ic was used in the creation of the production and 
trade cost measures.  To avoid endogeneity problems, the sample average of αus,ic for each county-
product pair was used when I applied the cost formulas.   
 
To facilitate the use of industry data, the connection between HS product codes and  4-digit SIC 
industry identifiers was made feasible by Peter Schott’s “HTS10 to SIC4 Concordance, 1989 to 
2001” available on his web site: http://www.som.yale.edu/faculty/pks4/sub_international.htm. 
Tariff rates and transportation costs used to create the trade cost measure, [(1+gict) + (1-αus,ic)* τit], 
were also  collected from Schott’s website.  A detailed description of Schott’s data is contained in 
Feenstra, Romalis and Schott (2002). 
 
Industry Characteristics 
Data on 4-digit SIC industry capital-intensity, and skill requirements were collected from the 
NBER Manufacturing Database, which is available from the National Bureau of Economic 
Research data site, at http://www.nber.org/data_index.html, as constructed by Bartlesman, Becker 
and Gray.  Capital-intensity was measured as the ratio of Capital to output, while worker skill 
requirements were measured by the ratio of non-production worker wages to total wages. 
 
Macroeconomic Variables 
Macroeconomic Variables were collected from the Penn World Tables: Alan Heston, Robert 
Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.1, Center for International Comparisons 
at the University of Pennsylvania (CICUP), October 2002.  The variable p, the price level of 
GDP, was used to measure country input costs when I used cost equation (1) to calculate 
production costs.   
 
Education 
Data on educational attainment were taken from Barro and Lee’s data, which are maintained at 
the, National Bureau of Economic Research, at http://www.nber.org/data_index.html.  Following 
Riker and Brainard (1997), the high education indicator variable was set to one for all countries 
whose education level for adults 25 and older averaged 6 or more years in 1990. 
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